Recent pushes for single-pilot operations have created a flurry of outcry from a growing number of industry association leaders who have made statements to the press to ridicule one the proposal to alter the design of aircraft to allow for single-pilot operations. Current discussion has largely focused on safety implications on the change. However, previous aircraft accident investigations provide detailed implications for how single pilot operations might affect aviation safety. Jekaterina Shalopanova, Chief Business Officer of Aerviva, provides insight into what applicable accident reports say about crew resource management and aviation safety.

Understanding arguments history and rationale

The conversation around single-pilot operations isn’t new. Recent debate was first ignited years ago, when the chief commercial officer of the world’s largest aircraft OEM made statements endorsing the change in design, citing the technological feasibility of the concept. In the face of repeated waves of criticism, the OEM has continued making statements supporting the idea.

“While criticism of the proposal has been loud, the insistence on single-pilot operations is backed by the realities of the pilot shortage and advancements of technology,” Jekaterina Shalopanova, Chief Business Officer of Aerviva, said. “Technology of the flight deck has fundamentally changed how aircraft are flown in the last 50 years.”

The idea for single-pilot operations is a part of a new regulatory framework of extended minimum crew operations (eMCO). Proponents of eMCO changes cite the idea of a shortage of aircrew. Boeing’s pilot outlook forecasted demand for 2.3 million new pilots by 2043, currently doesn’t consider a drop in demand from potential changes to eMCO regulations.

This is combined with a decades-long tendency for aircraft to feature new and advanced avionics that have proven to be massive assets for increasing pilot situational awareness while reducing crewmember workload for safety’s benefit.

“Modern technology has undoubtedly made flying easier and safer now that the increased amount of automation has changed crewmember workload.” Shalopanova said. “Critics of single pilot operations argue there would be a safety concern without a second pilot during upsets, or engine failures.”

While one OEM is pushing for eMCO changes argue that pilot workload can be reduced with increases of technology, previous investigators have found that during incidents in both highly modern and vintage aircraft, certain types of potential problems and technology can dramatically change crew workload.

Technology as a complicating factor in aircraft incidents

One recent incident where aircraft technology potentially added to the work of the pilots was the 2010 incident onboard Qantas Flight 32. During the flight, an Airbus A380-800 departing Singapore’s Changi Airport (SIN) suffered an uncontained engine failure shortly after takeoff, requiring increased pilot workload despite new technology.

“In the first few moments of the engine failure, the aircrew had to deal with engine failure, engine fire, and the failure of numerous other systems,” Shalopanova said. “During this incident, the technological complexity of the A380 added to the pilot’s workload, as they were not only tasked with retuning to Singapore for an emergency landing without an engine, but also dealing with complexity of software reporting technically details of the failure.”

A complicating element of Qantas 32’s engine failure was its severity. When the engine failed, it sent shrapnel into hydraulic, cooling, and electrical system wiring in the wing and fuselage of the passenger jet.

The complexity of error messages required the crew to follow 100 checklists, according to Captain Richard de Crespigny, who added that First Officer Matt Hicks needed 55 minutes to completely diagnose and respond to error messages on the aircraft’s electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM). During this stage of the flight, Captain de Crespingy was flying the aircraft, which had several features of the autopilot unusable during the emergency, sending second officer Matt Johnson into the passenger cabin to gain more situational awareness of the problem.

“According to accident reports, there were as many as 32 messages on the aircraft’s ECAM within the first 20 seconds of engine failure,” Shalopanova said. “During this stressful time as the crewmembers were dealing with engine failure, they were required to split tasks between the actual flying of the airplane and understanding the complexity of the software and hardware malfunctions.”

While the Airbus A380 involved in Qantas 32 was one of the most modern aircraft types in service, it reflects a decades-long change in flight deck technology. The A380 will often have multiple pilots as part of the flight crew due to its usage on long-range flights, even if the aircraft can be flown with as little as two crew members.

“While the A380 is incredibly modern and complex, with the requirement for only two crew members to operate, multiple pilots were needed due to failures and complexities of the aircraft’s modern technology,” Shalopanova said.

The standard for good CRM with 3 crew members: United flight 232

Vintage aircraft types, including the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10, traditionally operated with a flight engineer to assist in the management of engines and systems onboard the aircraft. Another catastrophic engine failure onboard a DC-10 operating as United Airlines flight 232 set the international standard for how crew resource management was required to operate the aircraft.

“United Airlines flight 232 was another incident where the faulty design of an OEM required multiple crew members to address,” Shalopanova said. “The incident rightly earned the reputation of being the impossible landing, due to the engine failure.”

During flight 232, the catastrophic failure of the central engine caused the aircraft to lose hydraulic systems and control capabilities. The pilots and flight engineer coordinated their efforts to control the aircraft by only relying on differentiating engine power, allowing 184 individuals to survive a hard emergency landing at Sioux Gateway Airport (SUX) in Iowa.

The captain of flight 232 later told the Seattle Times that the crew was too busy to be scared while attempting to fly the aircraft after the failure of its control systems.

“‘What is it doing?’ is an increasingly frequent quandary found on black box recordings, as more crew members are captivated by the complexity of modern equipment, requiring ever increasing amount of training and focus on the functions and programming of machines rather than the physics of flight or situations outside the flightdeck” Shalopanova said. “When good CRM is used, a second crew member serves to balance the workload so other crew are not so far removed from the flight while focusing on other complex tasks.”

Other examples of incidents requiring attention before consideration of eMCO

One heinous example of how technology’s unreliability can compromise flight safety occurred on a Lockheed L-1011-1 Tristar operating as Eastern Air Lines flight 401. During this incident, pilots became distracted by the failure of an indicator light in the cockpit, causing controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). On this flight, the autopilot system had commanded the aircraft to descend to the ground while the aircrew was too occupied with working other issues onboard to notice.

Both Eastern Airlines 401 and United Airlines 232, despite their complexity, would be categorized as loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) and CFIT. While each accident had different root causes of failure as occurrences, as accident types, CFIT and LOC-I accounted for 28.6% of fatal accidents in 2022, according to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

“It is currently unknown what specific technology, flight management software, or avionics will be used in the argument for regulatory changes to allow eMCO” Shalopanova said. “These few accidents, and several others describe dramatic changes in crew workload, which will need to be planned for before single-pilot operations becomes more commercially viable.”